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Abstract This article studies the role of participation in the budgeting process when
the company has to coordinate two interdependent divisions. The focus lies on the
design of the budgeting process (top-down vs. participative budgets) and the
underlying supply of information. This is studied in a principal agent model where
two divisions (agents) jointly generate earnings. With the participative budgeting
process, the company (principal) implements an information system that provides
the division managers with private information. Two economic effects occur. First,
the company can benefit from the division managers’ private information by per-
fectly coordinating the divisions’ operations. Second, the company has to induce the
managers to provide productive effort and with participation, to additionally report
truthfully. Thus, the company incurs incentive costs. The two considered budgeting
processes trade off these effects diametrically. For a low importance of coordina-
tion, the company prefers the top-down budgeting process and not installing an
information system that allows the managers to obtain private information. Other-
wise, the participative budgeting process is used. In contrast to the company,
managers always prefer the participative budgeting process. In addition, the model
predicts that a higher earnings potential increases the attractiveness of participative
budgets.
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1 Introduction
In practice, the design of the budgeting process among companies is not
homogeneous (Shastri and Stout 2008). Companies can choose from a broad
spectrum of design possibilities for the budgeting process. The two generic design
possibilities, top-down and participative, represent the two ends of this spectrum.
Lately, the participative budgeting process and the associated reporting behavior of
managers has attracted considerable attention by experimental research (see Shields
and Young 1993; Evans III et al. 2001; Fisher et al. 2002; Hannan et al. 2006;
Matuszewski 2010; Rankin et al. 2008; Altenburger 2017). A significant part of this
research has focused on the consequences of participation in the budgeting process
and not its antecedents (a comprehensive literature review is provided by Shields
and Shields 1998). However, the reasons for the use of participation in the
budgeting process have often been neglected. This paper studies the role of
participation in the budgeting process if company’s divisions are confronted with
interdependence. In particular, the company’s preference for implementing a top-
down or a participative budgeting process is examined.
Interdependencies among divisions frequently occur. According to economic
theory, several transactions are organized within a single company whenever the
joint organization yields a higher outcome than the outcome generated by the
market mechanism. In particular, a company with several organizational units
obtains a higher outcome compared to the sum of the outcomes generated by each
organizational unit acting independently on the market (see Coase 1937). Therefore,
the value of a company arises from interdependencies among the units. If a
company did not have interdependencies, the market would perfectly coordinate the
units and the units would act as separate companies. Hence, a company is regularly
subject to interdependencies. Coordination among the units of a company regarding
their operations is often seen as a crucial element for the company’s success. Weber
and Camerer (2003), for example, find evidence that failures to coordinate may have
substantial negative effects. They find that failures to coordinate different corporate
cultures contribute to the failure of corporate mergers.
One management accounting tool regularly used for coordinating interdepen-
dencies is budgets and the associated budgeting process. The budgeting process
allows the managing owner to formulate a consistent plan for the whole company
including its divisions by considering the existing interdependencies. Budgets are
widely used in practice (Libby and Lindsay 2007; Shastri and Stout 2008) and they
help the company to focus on important actions to satisfy its customers’ needs
(Horngren et al. 2015, pp. 220–221). Accordingly, the majority of managers thinks
that budgets are indispensable (Libby and Lindsay 2007). Practitioners perceive
budgets especially useful for operational control, planning, and communication
(Shastri and Stout 2008).
The communication function of budgets comes into effect when division
managers are potentially better informed about their divisions’ contribution to the
success of the company than the managing owner (superior). However, managers
often have incentives to misreport their private information. The misreporting harms
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the company by providing the divisions with excessive payments and distorting the
coordination. However, the company can affect the provided payments and the
reporting behavior of the managers through the design of the budgeting process.
With a top-down budgeting process, the superior (she) determines the level of the
budget without any information provided by her subordinates. When a participative
budgeting process is implemented, the superior asks her subordinates for
information regarding their immediate environmental conditions [see Zimmerman
(2017, pp. 229–230), Atkinson et al. (2012, pp. 381–382), and Weetman (2006, p.
316)]. Hence, the managers’ private information can be used. The results of Shields
and Shields (1998) highlight that, in practice, participative budgets are particularly
important for vertical information sharing and coordinating interdependencies.
The design of the budgeting process is studied in a setting in which two divisions
of a company are confronted with interdependence. For example, one division is
responsible for marketing and the other for R&D. Both divisions’ operations
together determine the probability of the company to earn high earnings. Each
division manager can privately learn his division’s contribution to the probability of
the company to obtain high earnings. The company can only observe the realized
earnings and does not learn the contribution of a single division. Specifically, the
marketing manager and the R&D manager can privately learn how good the aspired
marketing strategy and the aspired product design fit the market needs, respectively.
Even if one division’s fit is low, the company may still earn high earnings.
However, the probability to obtain high earnings is smaller. For example, if the
marketing division’s aspired marketing strategy is not very successful in marketing
the product, the potential customers may still buy some of the products if they
realize that the product design meets their needs. On the other hand, if the product
design does not meet the market needs, the marketing division may still succeed in
persuading some potential customers to buy the product.
Another example is two divisions operating in separate markets. One division is
responsible for all the operations regarding selling the products of the company in
market A and the other in market B. However, due to the known interdependence,
the accounting system reports only one earnings number. For example, separate
sales areas within a geographical area are often aggregated. The division manager in
market A and the division manager in market B can privately learn how good their
aspired division operations fit the market needs of market A and B, respectively.
Clients who are attracted by the internationality of the company and the
corresponding brand might purchase the company’s products in market A and
market B.
In the considered setting, two economic forces are at work. On one hand, when
the managing owner enables the managers to obtain private information about the
operation’s market fit of their division, this information can be used by her to
coordinate the operations of the interdependent divisions. For the example of a
marketing and R&D division, coordination manifests itself in matching the
marketing strategy and the product design. For the example of two divisions
operating in market A and B, coordination can be that the marketing campaigns of
both divisions are matched, a joint standard for sale-related services is determined
(e.g., the same terms of delivery or procedure to handle complaints), or the public
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appearance in both markets is aligned. A successful coordination of the divisions
enhances the expected profitability of the company. On the other hand, the managers
incur personal costs for providing productive effort. The unobservable effort supply
allows the managers to misreport to the company without any threat of detection.
The design of the budgeting process enables the managing owner to either use or not
use the managers’ potential private information regarding the market fits. With a
participative budgeting process, the company incurs costs for having productive
effort supplied and for inducing truthful reporting by the managers. Then, the
company benefits from using this accurate information for a perfect coordination. In
a top-down budgeting process, the managing owner does not install an information
system that allows the managers to obtain the coordination relevant private
information. Nevertheless, the company provides incentives to induce the managers
to provide productive effort. This results in smaller incentive costs than in a
participative budgeting process. Without the accurate information, the managing
owner performs the coordination according to her prior beliefs. This results in
imperfect coordination. Thus, the company forfeits the benefit from perfectly
coordinating the divisions in favor of saving on the costs for inducing the managers
to truthfully report their private information.
The model shows that, in the case of a low importance of coordination, the loss
from imperfect coordination in a top-down budgeting process is outweighed by the
additional costs for inducing truth-telling in a participative budgeting process. That
is, the company prefers to implement a top-down budgeting process and to keep the
managers uninformed. For a high importance of coordination, the use of a
participative budgeting process is optimal. The results illustrate that the company
might prefer to use a top-down budgeting process instead of a participative
budgeting process. However, this is not true for the managers of the divisions. The
managers receive higher positive expected rents with participation than they receive
with top-down budgets. Thus, the managers always prefer to have a participative
budgeting process in place.
A raise in the earnings potential intensifies the effect of coordination on the
expected earnings. Thus, the negative effect of an imperfect coordination by the
managing owner increases. Imperfect coordination only occurs in a top-down
budgeting process. The incentive costs with both a top-down and a participative
budgeting process are unaffected by an increase in the earning potential. In sum, the
economic effect of coordination becomes stronger, whereas the incentive costs are
unaffected. Therefore, an increase in the earnings potential makes the use of a
participative budgeting process more attractive relative to the use of a top-down
budgeting process.
This paper contributes to the literature in three ways. First, it complements the
insights generated by the analytical literature on managers’ participation in the
budgeting process. Given a budget-based bonus scheme, Magee (1980) establishes
that a manager’s participation in the budgeting process is detrimental for the
company, because the manager maximally misreports. Baiman and Evans III (1983)
highlight that the company prefers the participative budgeting process only when
the manager is induced to report the private decision-relevant information truthfully.
Contrary to Magee (1980) and Baiman and Evans III (1983), the present paper
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illustrates that the top-down budgeting process might be preferred by the company
due to lower incentive costs, although the managers report truthfully in the
participative budgeting process. Penno (1990) finds that the company solely prefers
a manager’s participation in the budgeting process when the compensation contract
can be based on the reported private information. Despite basing the compensation
contract on the reported private information in the participative budgeting process,
the present paper shows that the top-down budgeting process is preferred for a low
importance of coordinating the divisions’ interdependence. Kirby et al. (1991) study
participation in a setting where the manager is induced to set unbiased hurdles by a
compensation scheme belonging to a class of budget-based performance evaluation
schemes. Participation can reduce the manager’s informational rents and, therefore,
be preferred by the company. The present paper’s finding complements this result
by highlighting that the top-down budgeting process might be preferred because of
lower informational rents. Heinle et al. (2014) illustrate that the company prefers a
top-down budgeting process whenever the level of information asymmetry between
the manager and her superior is small. The present paper adds to this finding by
showing the impact of the importance of coordinating the divisions’ operations on
the design of the budgeting process.
Second, this paper adds to the analytical literature on choosing an information
system and the manager’s participation in the budgeting process. Christensen (1982)
provides an example in which the company is better off when a risk-averse manager
neither obtains private decision-relevant information nor participates in the
budgeting process compared to obtaining the information and participating in the
budgeting process. This is in line with the present paper’s findings. While
Christensen ’s finding stems from a shift in the trade-off of risk sharing and inducing
effort, the present paper illustrates the impact of the importance of coordination on
the design of the budgeting process. Penno (1984) highlights that enabling a
manager to obtain private decision-relevant information is beneficial for the
company when the company can design the information system’s characteristics.
This result holds whether the manager participates in the budgeting process or not.
In the present paper, the company cannot choose the information system’s
characteristics. Thus, in line with Penno (1984), the company does not want the
managers to obtain private information in the top-down budgeting process. This is
discussed in more detail in Sect. 6. In addition, the present paper shows that
participation is preferred for a high importance of coordinating the interdependent
divisions’ operations, although the managers are informed in the participative
budgeting process. Given a participative budgeting process, Rajan and Saouma
(2006) examine the merits of different levels of information asymmetry between the
company and the manager ranging from perfectly informative, to somewhat
informative, to not informative at all. They find that the company prefers an
uninformed manager when the possible levels of the manager’s productivity are
similar. Otherwise, a fully informed manager is preferred. The uninformed
manager’s report does not convey any information, and therefore, this setting is
comparable to the present paper’s top-down budgeting process. This means that
Rajan and Saouma (2006) show that the similarity of the productivity levels
determine whether the manager participates in the budgeting process. Holding the
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productivity levels’ similarity constant, the present paper depicts the effect of the
importance of coordination on the design of the budgeting process.
Third, this paper contributes to the literature on capital budgeting. The analytical
literature on capital budgeting (see Antle and Eppen 1985; Antle and Fellingham
1990; Fellingham and Young 1990; Arya et al. 1994, 1996, 2000; Antle and
Fellingham 1995; Baiman et al. 2013) considers situations in which one or more
managers have access to investment projects. The manager(s) learn(s) the invest-
ment projects’ (expected) profitability. The superior has access to financial
resources and has to decide whether and under which conditions to finance the
investment project(s). This literature stresses the adverse selection problem inherent
in the budgeting process. In these models, communication of the managers is
optimal for the company, i.e., the participative budgeting process is always
preferred. The present study shows that the use of the top-down budgeting process is
optimal for a low importance of coordinating the company’s divisions. For a high
importance of coordination, a participative budgeting process yields a higher
expected profit. With a participative budgeting process, perfect coordination is
achieved. The associated benefits exceed the additional incentive costs of inducing
truthful reports from the managers when the importance of coordination is high.
The article proceeds as follows. In the next section, the model is described and
two benchmarks are displayed. As first benchmark, the first best solution is
considered in which the managing owner observes both the managers’ private
information and their productive effort supplies. The second benchmark examines
the setting when the managing owner learns the decision-relevant information, but
does not observe the managers’ productive effort supplies. Subsequently, in Sects. 3
and 4, the findings regarding the top-down and participative budgeting process are
presented. Afterwards, in Sect. 5, the findings for the top-down and the participative
budgeting process are compared. In addition, the role of the environmental
conditions on the design choice and empirical implications of the findings are
discussed. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 The model
The model described in this paper is a principal two agent model with different
objectives and an information asymmetry among the principal and the agents. A
risk-neutral managing owner (principal, P) leads a company with two divisions.
Each division is run by a risk-neutral division manager (agent i;Ai; i ¼ 1; 2). While
working for the principal, the agents may have the possibility to acquire private
information regarding the respective division’s market fit. The divisions’ market fits
affect the expected profitability of the company. Agent i’s fit with market needs is
denoted by gi, where gi ¼ gH and gi ¼ gL are equally likely for i ¼ 1; 2 with
0\gL\gH\1=2. The small value gL denotes a low fit with market needs and an
associated small probability to obtain high earnings. The random variables g1 and g2
are assumed to be independent.
At the beginning of the period, the principal designs the budgeting process. The
principal has two options for the design of the budgeting process. She can either
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implement a top-down (TB) or a participative (PB) budgeting process. With a
participative budgeting process in place, the agents obtain private information and
the principal asks the agents to report on their private information. She cannot
observe whether the reports are truthful or not. The report of agent i on his private
information is denoted by ri and can either be gL or gH. When the principal
implements a top-down budgeting process, the agents neither obtain private
information nor are asked to send a report. This means, whereas, in the participative
budgeting process, the principal implements an information system that privately
informs the agents about their divisions’ market fit, no information system is
installed in the top-down budgeting process. The information system can, for
example, regard market research, target costing, or value engineering which is
relevant for the divisions’ operations. Because specific expertise is needed for
interpreting the provided information each agent can solely observe her division’s
information. Installation costs of the information system are not explicitly
modeled.1 However, the implicit assumption is made that the principal does not
install a costly information system in the top-down budgeting process, because the
information cannot be elicited and, thus, not used by the principal. The assumption
that the agents do not obtain private information in a top-down budgeting process is
critically reflected in Sect. 6.
Next, agent i supplies personally costly productive effort ei. Agent i can choose
between two levels of productive effort ei 2 0; 1f g. With the high effort supply
ei ¼ 1, the probability to obtain high earnings is higher than with ei ¼ 0. Agent i
incurs personal costs wiðeiÞ for providing effort with wið1Þ ¼ c[ 0 and wið0Þ ¼ 0.
The principal does not learn the chosen level of productive effort supplied by agent
i. Throughout the analysis, the assumption is made that the principal benefits from
inducing high effort provision.
At the end of the period, both divisions jointly generate earnings x. The earnings
are either low, x ¼ xL, or high, x ¼ xH, where 0 xL\xH. Without loss of
generality, low earnings xL are set equal to zero. The probability to generate high
earnings is denoted by h and is not observable. With probability 1 h, low earnings
are achieved. The earnings x can be observed by all parties and are contractible.
The probability to obtain high earnings h is affected by both divisions’ market
fits, by both agents provided productive effort, and the principal’s conducted
coordinating adaptions a. The principal can choose her coordinating adaptions
between 2gL and 2gH. She does not incur costs from coordination. The importance
of coordination is denoted by b[ 0. b captures the impact of perfect coordination
compared to imperfect coordination. When the principal fails to perfectly coordinate
the divisions’ operations, the company suffers from a reduced probability to obtain
high earnings. A high b indicates that the principal can substantially increase the
probability to earn high earnings h by providing perfect coordination instead of
imperfect coordination. The probability to obtain high earnings h is given by the
following:
1 If installation costs of the information system exist, the net benefit of the participative budgeting
process decreases. Then, the interval of the importance of coordination for which the top-down budgeting
process is preferred becomes larger. The qualitative results of the paper are not affected by (neglected)
installation costs.
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h ¼ e1g1 þ e2g2  1 Ie1¼0;e2¼0
 
b g1 þ g2  aj j; ð1Þ
where Ie1¼0;e2¼0 takes on the value 1 if both agents do not provide high effort supply,
i.e., e1 ¼ 0 and e2 ¼ 0, or the value 0 in all other cases. This indicator variable is
introduced for technical reasons. That is, the indicator variable ensures that the
probability h belongs to the interval [0, 1] for all possible effort choices. In equi-
librium, the principal induces the agents to provide high effort, so that Ie1¼0;e2¼0
takes on the value 0. The effect of coordination in Eq. 1 may seem peculiar, because
coordination seems to be harmful. However, Eq. 1 captures that the probability to
obtain high earnings is higher with perfect coordination than with imperfect coor-
dination. In particular, with perfect coordination, i.e., a ¼ g1 þ g2, the term
 1 Ie1¼0;e2¼0
 
b g1 þ g2  aj j is zero, whereas, with imperfect coordination, this
term is negative. For example, g1 and g2 capture how much the aspired marketing
strategy and the aspired product design fit the market needs, respectively. The
implemented product design results in product features. With imperfect coordina-
tion, the implemented marketing strategy might not emphasize realized product
features that are highly valued by customers. As a consequence, the probability to
obtain high earnings diminishes. This is captured by the negative term
 1 Ie1¼0;e2¼0
 
b g1 þ g2  aj j in Eq. 1. Perfect coordination is achieved when all
realized product features that are highly valued by customers are conveyed by the
implemented marketing strategy. That is, perfect coordination results in higher
expected earnings. In this sense, perfect coordination is beneficial for the company.
The importance of coordination b is restricted to the interval 0;min 2; gLgHgL
n o 
to ensure that the probability h is non-negative and misreporting incentives exist. In
particular, the assumption b\ gLgHgL ensures that the probability h is non-negative.
For b\min 2; gLgHgL
n o
, agent i has an incentive to misreport in a participative
budgeting process. For b 2 min 2; gLgHgL
n o
; gLgHgL
h 
, agent i does not have any
incentives to misreport in a participative budgeting process. Note that the interval
min 2; gLgHgL
n o
; gLgHgL
h 
can be empty. To minimize the occurring case distinctions
in Sect. 5, the analysis is restricted to the case of the existing misreporting
incentives. This does not affect the qualitative results of Sect. 5.
At the end of the period, agent i is compensated. The compensation scheme is
based on the realized earnings. Agent i receives a compensation payment w
j;l
i when
xj has been realized and the budgeting process l is in place, where j 2 L;Hf g and
l 2 TB; PBf g. The agents’ reservation utility is zero and each agent is protected by
limited liability.
The principal seeks to maximize her expected utility which corresponds to the
expected profit of the company:
UlP ¼ x wj;l1  wj;l2 ; ð2Þ
where j ¼ H; L and l ¼ TB; PB.
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The agents are also expected utility maximizers. Agent i’s utility is determined
by the following:
UlAi ¼ w
j;l
i  wiðeiÞ; ð3Þ
where i ¼ 1; 2; j ¼ H; L, and l ¼ TB; PB.
The sequence of events is illustrated in Fig. 1.
Next, two benchmarks are examined. First, the first best solution is considered.
Here, the principal learns the realization of g1 and g2 and observes the agents’
productive effort supplies. The principal uses the information and chooses her
coordinating adaptions to maximize h. This results in perfect coordination. To
induce the agents to provide high productive effort, the principal has to reimburse
the agents’ personal costs c.
The first best solution is also obtained when the principal only observes the
agents’ effort provisions and implements the participative budgeting process. As
each agent is reimbursed his personal costs c, they do not have an incentive to
misreport the obtained private information. Thus, perfect coordination is achieved
when the principal observes the agents’ effort supplies.
Second, the setting when the principal learns the realization of the decision-
relevant information g1 and g2, but does not observe the provided productive efforts
is considered as a benchmark. Learning the decision-relevant information enables
the principal to perfectly coordinate the divisions’ operations. However, she needs
to provide the agents with adequate incentives to induce high effort supply.
Specifically, the principal needs to pay a bonus in the case of the high earnings.
With a low market fit, the probability to obtain high earnings is low. Thus, the bonus
in the case of a low market fit needs to be higher than with a high market fit. Due to
the moral hazard problem, each agent obtains a positive rent. The insights from the
two benchmarks is formally stated in Observation 1.
Observation 1 In the first best solution, that is the decision-relevant information
and the agents’ provided effort supplies are observed by the principal, each agent
receives a payment wfbi ¼ c for providing high effort.2
When the principal only observes the realization of the decision-relevant
information g1 and g2, she needs to provide a bonus, i.e., w
H;b2
i ðgiÞ ¼ c=gi and
The principal designs
the budgeting process
and contracts with the
agents
0
With participative
budgets: agent 1 (2)
learns the realization of
η1 (η2) and the agents
additionally send
reports r1 and r2 to the
principal
1
The principal conducts
coordinating adaptions a
and agent 1 (2) provides
productive effort e1 (e2)
2
The earnings x are
realized and the agents
are compensated
3
Fig. 1 Timeline
2 The superscript fb indicates the first best solution.
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w
L;b2
i ðgiÞ ¼ 0 for i ¼ 1; 2,3 to induce high effort provision by both agents. The
expected compensation of each agent includes a positive rent.
Proof The proof is stated in the ‘‘Appendix’’. h
3 Top-down budgeting process
This section addresses the second best solution with the top-down budgeting process
in place. The agents do not learn the realization of the decision-relevant information
and the principal does not ask the agents to send a report.
The principal chooses the coordinating adaptions a according to her prior beliefs.
Thus, in expectation, she cannot perfectly coordinate the divisions. Taking the
principal’s and the agents’ utilities into account (Eqs. 2 and 3) as well as the
probability to obtain high earnings h (Eq. 1), the principal solves the following
program for i; j ¼ 1; 2; i 6¼ j:
max
w
H;TB
i
;wL;TB
i
;a
E

h xH  wH;TB1  wH;TB2
 
þ 1 hð Þ wL;TB1  wL;TB2
 
e1; e2

ðP TBÞ
subject to:
w
H;TB
i ;w
L;TB
i  0 ðLL TBÞ
E hwH;TBi þ 1 hð ÞwL;TBi  eic
e1; e2
 
 0 ðIR TBÞ
E hwH;TBi þ 1 hð ÞwL;TBi  c
ei ¼ 1; ej ¼ 1
 
E hwH;TBi þ 1 hð ÞwL;TBi
ei ¼ 0; ej ¼ 1
 
ðIC TBÞ:
The limited liability constraints (LL TB) ensure that the agents do not have to pay
anything to the company. The individual rationality constraints (IR TB) make sure
that the agents want to work for the principal, because they receive at least their
reservation utility. The incentive compatibility constraints (IC TB) induce the
agents to provide high productive effort.
In line with the second benchmark, the principal needs to pay a bonus in the case
of the high earnings to induce high effort provision. However, as neither the
principal nor the agents observe the realization of the decision-relevant private
information the bonus is determined with the information’s expected probability
E½gi, i.e., wH;TBi ¼ c=E½gi. Thus, the principal incurs incentive costs because of the
moral hazard problem. Imperfect coordination reduces the probability to obtain high
earnings. However, this probability remains positive. Proposition 1 summarizes the
findings for the top-down budgeting process.
3 The superscript b2 indicates the second benchmark.
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Proposition 1 Under the top-down budgeting process, the optimal compensation
scheme is w
H;TB
i ¼ cE½gi and w
L;TB
i ¼ 0 for i ¼ 1; 2. The optimal coordinating
adaptions are determined by the following:
aTB ¼ E½g1 þ g2:
The expected utility for the principal is given by the following:
ETB½UP ¼ E½g1 þ g2 
1
2
ðgH  gLÞb
	 

xH  wH;TB1  wH;TB2
 
: ð4Þ
The expected utility for agent i; i ¼ 1; 2, is given by the following:
ETB½UAi  ¼ c 1
ðgH  gLÞb
E½g1 þ g2
 
[ 0: ð5Þ
Proof The proof is stated in the ‘‘Appendix’’. h
Under a top-down budgeting process, the principal induces the agents to provide
high productive effort. The effort provision is not observable by the principal.
Therefore, the agents obtain a positive expected utility. This corresponds to a
positive rent for each agent, because the agents’ reservation utility is zero.
By choosing the coordinating adaptions aTB, the principal minimizes the
expected loss incurred because of imperfect coordination. Compared to perfect
coordination, imperfect coordination results in reduced expected earnings.
4 Participative budgeting process
When the principal decides to implement the participative budgeting system at date
0, she asks both agents to send reports r1 and r2 about their private information g1
and g2 at date 1, respectively. The optimal compensation scheme in the second
benchmark (see Observation 1) illustrates that the bonus payment in the case of high
earnings needs to be higher for a low market fit than for a high market fit for
inducing high productive effort, that is w
H;b2
i ðgLÞ ¼ c=gL[ c=gH ¼ wH;b2i ðgHÞ.
When the importance of coordination b is smaller than 2 and if the principal used
the same payment scheme in the second best setting with participative budgets,
agent i would always claim to have observed a low market fit to obtain the high
bonus payment. Although this would result in imperfect coordination which reduces
agent i’s probability to obtain the bonus, this reduction in the expected
compensation is exceeded by the increase due to the higher bonus payment. As
noted in Sect. 2, the importance of coordination b needs to be smaller than gLgHgL to
ensure that the probability h is non-negative. Thus, with the participative budgeting
process and for b\min 2; gLgHgL
n o
, truth-telling cannot be induced using the
optimal compensation scheme of the second benchmark where the principal
observes the realization of the private information. In the event that 2\ gLgHgL, a
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different truth-telling incentive occurs for b 2 2; gLgHgL
h 
. Specifically, using the
optimal compensation scheme of the second benchmark induces the agents to report
truthfully. The intuition is as follows. If the agents misreport, the principal’s
coordinating adaptions would be imperfect. This would lower the agents’ expected
compensation. Contrary to the event of an importance of coordination smaller than
2, the increase in the agents’ expected compensation from the higher bonus payment
does not outweigh the loss from imperfect coordination. Consequently, truth-telling
is always optimal for the agents. For
gL
gHgL  2, the interval 2;
gL
gHgL
h 
is empty, so
that only the first case of misreporting incentives occur. To not unnecessarily
complicate the exposition of the results, the analysis is restricted to
b\min 2; gLgHgL
n o
as noted in Sect. 2. This does not affect the qualitative results
regarding the comparison of the top-down and the participative budgeting process.
For b\min 2; gLgHgL
n o
, misreporting incentives exist and the principal needs to
design the compensation scheme, so that each agent is induced to truthfully reveal
his private information and to provide high productive effort. The revelation
principle applies in this case. With the participative budgeting process, the principal
has to solve the following program for ri 2 gL; gHf g; i; j ¼ 1; 2 and i 6¼ j:
max
w
H;PB
i
ðriÞ;wL;PBi ðriÞ
E

h xH  wH;PB1 ðr1Þ  wH;PB2 ðr2Þ
 
þ 1 hð Þ wL;PB1 ðr1Þ  wL;PB2 ðr2Þ
 
r1; r2; e1; e2

ðP PBÞ
subject to:
w
H;PB
i ðriÞ;wL;PBi ðriÞ 0 ðLL PBÞ
E hwH;PBi ðgiÞ þ 1 hð ÞwL;PBi ðgiÞ  eic
r1; r2; e1; e2
 
 0 ðIR PBÞ
hðri ¼ gi; rj ¼ gj; ei ¼ 1; ej ¼ 1Þ wH;PBi ðgiÞ  wL;PBi ðgiÞ
 
þ wL;PBi ðgiÞ  c
 hðri ¼ gi; rj ¼ gj; ei ¼ 0; ej ¼ 1Þ wH;PBi ðgiÞ  wL;PBi ðgiÞ
 þ wL;PBi ðgiÞ ðIC PBÞ
h ri ¼ gi; rj ¼ gj; e1 ¼ 1; e2 ¼ 1
 
w
H;PB
i ðgiÞ  wL;PBi ðgiÞ
 þ wL;PBi ðgiÞ
 h ri; rj ¼ gj; e1 ¼ 1; e2 ¼ 1
 
w
H;PB
i ðriÞ  wL;PBi ðriÞ
 þ wL;PBi ðriÞ ðTT PBÞ
a 2 argmaxa^ E g1 þ g2  b g1 þ g2  a^j j j r1; r2; e1; e2½  ðICP PBÞ
:
The principal’s objective (P PB) illustrates that the compensation scheme is
determined at date 0. The limited liability constraints (LL PB) restrict the com-
pensation scheme to non-negative payments. The individual rationality constraints
(IR PB) make sure that each agent receives at least his reservation utility. Thus, he
wants to accept the contract offered by the principal at date 0. The incentive
compatibility constraints for the agents (IC PB) ensure that both agents provide high
productive effort. Truthful reporting by the agents is induced by meeting the truth-
telling constraints (TT PB). The constraint (ICP PB) illustrates that the principal
conducts the coordinating adaptions a after receiving both agents’ reports r1 and r2.
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The principal conducts these coordinating adaptions, so that the probability to
achieve high earnings is maximized.
The agents’ reports affect the principal’s choice of coordinating adaptions. When
the agents misreport, the principal conducts imperfect coordination. Thus, the
probability to obtain high earnings is reduced compared to truthful reports. The
agents’ compensation payments are linked to the observable realization of the
earnings. A reduced probability to achieve high earnings hurts the agents’
probability to receive the compensation payment associated with high earnings.
The principal sets the compensation payments, so that each agent finds it optimal to
provide high effort and report truthfully. Compared to the top-down budgeting
process, the additional truth-telling issue increases the principal’s incentive costs.
The solution to the principal’s optimization program is summarized in Proposition
2.
Proposition 2 Under the participative budgeting process, the principal determi-
nes the coordinating adaptions a and the compensation scheme for i ¼ 1; 2 as
follows:
– aPB ¼ g1 þ g2, and
– w
H;PB
i ðgHÞ ¼ cgL
2gHðgHgLÞb
2gH
;wH;PBi ðgLÞ ¼ cgL ;w
L;PB
i ðrHÞ ¼ wL;PBi ðrLÞ ¼ 0,
where w
H;PB
i ðgHÞ[wH;b2i ðgHÞ and wH;PBi ðgLÞ ¼ wH;b2i ðgLÞ.
The principal’s expected utility is given by the following:
EPB½UP ¼ E½g1 þ g2xH 
c
4gHgL
8gHðgH þ gLÞ  bðgH  gLÞð3gH þ gLÞ½ : ð6Þ
The expected utility for agent i; i ¼ 1; 2, is given by the following:
EPB½UAi  ¼ c
gH
gL
 bðgH  gLÞð3gH þ gLÞ
8gHgL
	 

; ð7Þ
where EPB½UAi [ETB½UAi .
Proof The proof is stated in the ‘‘Appendix’’. h
The compensation scheme for agent i w
H;PB
i ðriÞ;wL;PBi ðriÞ
 
; i ¼ 1; 2, reveals
some interesting insights. If the importance of coordination is high, i.e., b is high,
the principal needs to pay less compensation for a high report and high earnings.
Thus, the rents to agent i for inducing a high effort supply and truthful reporting are
diminished. The negative effect of agent i’s misreporting on his expected
compensation payment becomes more severe for a high importance of coordination.
Thus, it becomes cheaper to induce high effort supply for a high report whenever
coordination is very important. In addition, the agents’ compensation payments in
the case of realized high earnings xH are not affected by the level of xH. The benefit
from their joint production, i.e., the synergy, is arbitrarily split between the two
agents. Comparing the compensation scheme in Proposition 2 with the one of the
second benchmarks stated in Observation 1 reveals that only the bonus payment for
a high report is adapted due to the truth-telling issue. Specifically,
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w
H;PB
i ðgHÞ[wH;b2i ðgHÞ ¼ c=gH, i.e., the bonus payment for a high report in the
participative budgeting process is higher than the corresponding payment in the
second benchmark. Thus, the incentive costs with participative budgets comprise
two components: one for inducing high productive effort and one for ensuring truth-
telling.
By basing the coordinating adaptions aPB on the agents’ truthful reports, the
principal provides perfect coordination. With perfect coordination, the probability to
obtain high earnings and thus, the expected earnings are as high as possible.
However, the principal also has to bear incentive costs which are larger than with
top-down budgets.
Both agents jointly affect the principal’s coordination choice by reporting
relevant private information and providing productive effort. Arguably, they might
have incentives to increase their expected utility by colluding. However, the agents
do not want to collude under the participative budgeting process. They neither
jointly agree on their reports sent to the principal nor on their effort choice. If one
agent misreports his private information gi, the other agent’s compensation
scheme is not affected. Misreporting has a negative effect on the principal’s
coordinating adaptions a. The probability h to attain high earnings declines. This
reduces the expected compensation payment for each agent. A reduction in the
expected compensation payment is not in the interest of either agent. Therefore, the
agents refrain from collusion with regards to reporting. Neither do the agents benefit
from having only one or neither agent perform high effort. With low productive
effort, the probability to obtain the bonus payment decreases. The reduction in both
agents’ expected compensation payments exceeds the reduction in personal costs by
providing low effort instead of high effort. As a consequence, the agents also refrain
from collusion with regards to effort provision. This finding is summarized in
Corollary 1.
Corollary 1 The agents never find it optimal to collude if the principal implements
the participative budgeting process.
Proof The proof is stated in the ‘‘Appendix’’. h
5 Comparison of the top-down and the participative budgeting process
At date 0, the principal decides whether to implement a top-down or a participative
budgeting process. According to the given environmental conditions, she prefers
one or the other budgeting processes. The importance of coordination b is critical
for the design of the budgeting process.
The principal deliberates whether to incur additional incentive costs regarding
truthful reporting and thus being able to perfectly coordinate the agents’ operations
in a participative budgeting process, or to save on incentive costs and suffer from
imperfect coordination in a top-down budgeting process. If the importance of
coordination is low, the additional incentive costs exceed the benefits from perfect
coordination. Consequently, the principal prefers to implement a top-down
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budgeting process. However, when the importance of coordination b is large, the
benefits from improved coordination outweigh the additional incentive costs for
inducing truthful reporting by the agents. Therefore, the principal implements a
participative budgeting process. The findings are summarized in Proposition 3 and
visualized in Fig. 2.
Proposition 3 For a low importance of coordination b\bc, the principal prefers
to implement the top-down budgeting process.
For a high importance of coordination b bc, the principal prefers to implement
the participative budgeting process.
The cut-off level bc is determined by the following:
bc ¼ 8cgHðgH þ gLÞ
c 3g2H  4gHgL þ g2Lð Þ þ 2gHgLðgH þ gLÞxH
[ 0: ð8Þ
Proof The proof is stated in the ‘‘Appendix’’. h
Proposition 3 states the main result of this paper. The principal faces a trade-off
between additional incentive costs and coordination benefits. For both the top-down
and the participative budgeting process, the principal incurs incentive costs for
inducing high productive effort supply. The additional incentive costs ensure that
the agents report truthfully with participative budgets. With truthful reports about
their private decision-relevant information, the principal can perfectly coordinate
the agents’ operations. Imperfect coordination results in reduced expected earnings.
Under a participative budgeting process, the principal incurs the additional incentive
costs and benefits from perfect coordination. With top-down budgets, the principal
does not need to provide additional incentives. Thus, she saves on the additional
incentive costs. However, the principal suffers from reduced expected earnings
because of imperfect coordination. In a situation of a low importance of
Fig. 2 top-down or participative budgets (plotted for c ¼ 1; gL ¼ 0:25; gH ¼ 0:35, and xH ¼ 10; E½UP
denotes the principal’s expected utility; TB (PB) stands for top-down (participative) budgets; b is the
importance of coordination)
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coordination b, the principal prefers to use a top-down budgeting process. Thus, a
top-down budgeting process can be optimal for the principal. For a high importance
of coordination, the principal uses a participative budgeting process. Then, a top-
down budgeting process is never optimal for the principal. This finding is aligned
with the empirical findings of Shields and Shields (1998). They illustrate that
coordinating interdependence is one of the most important reasons for the
participation of managers in the budgeting process. The model predicts that the
principal prefers to use a participative compared to a top-down budgeting process
for a high importance of coordinating the interdependent divisions.
The findings of the present paper highlight that the use of a top-down budgeting
process might be optimal, too. The reason is that the principal can diametrically
trade off additional incentive costs and coordination benefits through implementing
either a top-down or a participative budgeting process.
Christensen (1982), Penno (1984), and Kanodia (1993) highlight the optimality
of participative budgets in some operating budgeting settings. In these papers, the
use of a top-down budgeting process would be suboptimal. Magee (1980) and Kirby
et al. (1991) study a setting in which a top-down budgeting process might be
preferred to a participative budgeting process. In contrast to the present setting,
these studies consider exogenous compensation schemes. They highlight that given
these compensation schemes, the principal might prefer to have no participation by
the agents. Penno (1990) illustrates that participation by the agents might not always
be strictly preferred to no participation, i.e., a top-down approach. However, Penno
(1990) does not find a strict preference for a top-down budgeting process as is the
case in the present paper.
Using Proposition 3, the model predicts that the importance of coordination is
positively associated with the managers’ participation in the budgeting process. For
a high (low) importance of coordination, (no) participation in the budgeting process
is expected to be observed in practice. Neither the importance of coordination nor
the design of the budgeting process is usually disclosed in the annual report or other
public sources. Thus, a case study or a survey seems appropriate for testing the
model’s empirical implication regarding the impact of the importance of coordi-
nation on the design of the budgeting process. When archival data are used for
testing the model’s empirical implication, proxies for the importance of coordina-
tion and the design of the budgeting process need to be used. A proxy for the use of
the participative budgeting process can be a cooperative management style which is
sometimes referred to in annual reports. Next, two possible proxies for the
importance of coordination are discussed. First, the importance of coordination is
presumably positively associated with the divisions’ level of interdependence. For
example, the divisions of a conglomerate might be less interdependent than the
divisions of a company operating in a single industry. Then, the model predicts that
conglomerates use a participative budgeting process at the division manager level
less than companies operating in a single industry. That is, operating in a single
industry might be a proxy for a high importance of coordinating the interdependent
divisions. Second, both a high relevance of R&D and a large proportion of new
products in the company’s sales mix suggest a large interdependence of the R&D
and the marketing division, and thus, a high importance of coordination. The
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relevance of R&D can be captured by the ratio of R&D expenses to revenue. This
proxy presumes that no survivor bias occurs.
The importance of coordination, captured by b, affects the height of the benefits
from perfect coordination compared to imperfect coordination. When the principal’s
coordination is important for the company, i.e., b is high, the benefits from perfect
coordination are also high. The incentive costs for inducing the agents to provide
high productive effort and with participative budgets to also report truthfully are
also affected by the importance of coordination. For an increase in the importance of
coordination, the negative impact on the agents’ expected compensation through not
supplying high productive effort and misreporting is rising. In particular, the
probability to obtain the high compensation payment in the case of high earnings
declines. Thus, the principal can reduce the level of compensation payments needed
to incentivize the agents. In sum, an increase in the importance of coordination
affects both main economic forces at work in this setting, i.e., the incentive costs
and the benefits from perfect coordination. The incentive costs are decreasing,
whereas the benefits from perfect coordination are increasing in the importance of
coordination. As a consequence, the principal’s expected utility under the top-down
budgeting process is decreasing as imperfect coordination becomes more harmful.
The principal’s expected utility under the participative budgeting process is
increasing in the importance of coordination, because the incentive costs decrease
and the benefits from perfect coordination raise. This is also depicted in Fig. 2.
Corollary 2 The principal’s expected utility using the top-down budgeting process
is monotonically decreasing in the importance of coordination b.
The principal’s expected utility with the participative budgeting process is
monotonically increasing in the importance of coordination b.
Proof The proof is stated in the ‘‘Appendix’’. h
The principal’s expected utilities with a top-down and a participative budgeting
process are increasing in the earnings potential xH. The relative attractiveness of a
top-down and a participative budgeting process is captured by the cut-off level bc.
For an importance of coordination below this threshold, the top-down budgeting
process yields a higher expected utility for the principal than a participative
budgeting process. For an importance of coordination above the threshold bc, the
opposite is true. When the earnings potential xH increases, the principal’s expected
utilities with a top-down and a participative budgeting process also increase. The
increase is higher with a participative budgeting process than with a top-down
budgeting process because of imperfect coordination with a top-down budget.
Therefore, the cut-off level bc is smaller for a higher earnings potential xH. The
range for which a top-down budgeting process is implemented, i.e., 0; bc½ Þ, becomes
smaller when the earnings potential increases. As a consequence, an increase in the
earnings potential reduces the potential use of a top-down budgeting process. This is
stated in Corollary 3 and displayed in Fig. 3.
Corollary 3 The relative use of a participative compared to a top-down budgeting
process is increasing in the earnings potential xH.
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Proof The proof is stated in the ‘‘Appendix’’. h
When a top-down budgeting process is in place, the agents are not induced to
provide truthful reports. Therefore, the agents only receive incentives for providing
high productive effort. The resulting rent is positive, i.e., each agent’s expected
utility exceeds his reservation utility of zero (Proposition 1). In the case of a
participative budgeting process, the agents obtain additional rents, because the
principal provides adapted compensation payments that induce the agents to
truthfully report their private decision-relevant information. Consequently, if the
agents designed the budgeting process in date 0, they would implement a
participative budgeting process and obtain higher positive rents. This insight
conforms with empirical findings. Practitioners would like to use more participation
in the budgeting system (Libby and Lindsay 2010). Heinle et al. (2014) also
illustrate that agents prefer a participative budgeting process to a top-down
budgeting process. The intuition is similar. With a participative budgeting process,
the agent controls the reporting and the productive effort supply. In a top-down
budgeting process, the agent only controls the productive effort supply and the
principal controls the reporting. Thus, in Heinle et al. (2014), the agent receives less
rents with top-down budgets than under a participative budgeting process. In the
present paper, the agents also control the effort supply and the reporting when a
participative budgeting process is implemented. However, for a top-down budgeting
process, the control over reporting is completely set mute. This means, neither the
agents nor the principal controls the reporting. The findings of Corollary 4
correspond to the results of Heinle et al. (2014), i.e., the agents obtain more rents
with a participative budgeting process compared to a top-down budgeting process.
Top Down Budgets
Participative Budgets
10 20 30 40 50
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
Fig. 3 top-down or participative budgets with regards to the earnings potential xH (plotted for
c ¼ 1; gL ¼ 0:25, and gH ¼ 0:35; bc denotes the cut-off level regarding the importance of coordination;
xH is the earnings potential)
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Corollary 4 The agents strictly prefer the participative budgeting process to the
top-down budgeting process.
Proof This directly follows from Proposition 2. h
6 Discussion and conclusion
This paper examines the design of the budgeting process when a company faces an
interdependence among the divisions. In particular, two generic design possibilities
are considered. The company can either implement a top-down or a participative
budgeting process. The design of the budgeting process at the beginning of the
period determines whether the managers will obtain and report private information
or not. Under a top-down budgeting process, the managers do not obtain private
information, whereas this information is obtained and acknowledged in a
participative budgeting process.
The model design is subject to a couple of limitations. First, the assumption is
invoked that, in a top-down budgeting process, the managers do not obtain private
information. For example, this information can stem from market research, target
costing, or value engineering and the managers’ expertise is needed to interpret the
provided information. Throughout this paper, the company decides not to
implement the information system like market research, target costing, or value
engineering when the top-down budgeting process is implemented. This means, the
company does not enable the managers to obtain the information needed for
coordination. If the managers also obtained the private information in the top-down
budgeting process, the company would need to provide higher expected compen-
sation to induce high effort supply. With private information, the managers know
exactly how high effort affects the probability to obtain high earnings. Without
private information, the managers know this only in expectation. Thus, more
compensation is needed when the managers are informed. Due to the revelation
principle, the top-down budgeting process never becomes strictly optimal when the
managers are informed. However, as the compensation costs with a top-down
budgeting process are smaller when the managers do not obtain the private
information, the company does not want the managers to be informed. Hence, the
company does not want the managers to obtain private information in a top-down
budgeting process and the information system is not installed. The advantage of this
assumption is that it enables the model to establish a strict preference of the top-
down budgeting process for a low importance of coordination. This is in line with
the empirical finding that both top-down and participative budgeting processes are
implemented in practice (Shastri and Stout 2008). Next to this advantage, the
assumption also bears a drawback. The budgeting process is connected to a specific
information setup which is an exogenous restriction on the company’s design of the
information system. However, as outlined above, when the company chooses the
design of the budgeting process and the information setup, it either chooses the top-
down or the participative budgeting process as studied in the present paper.
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Further limitations of the present study are the binary structure of private
information, effort, and compensation, the symmetry of the divisions, and the
independence of the (additional) incentive costs from the earnings potential.
Alleviating these restrictions might yield additional interesting insights. Next to this
disadvantage, these assumptions allow an easily comprehensible model analysis that
illustrates how the importance of coordinating interdependent divisions affects the
design of the budgeting process. Accordingly, these assumptions are used to have a
parsimonious model that allows to concentrate on the two main economic effects
prevailing in the studied setting.
The two economic effects regard benefits from coordination and additional
incentive costs for inducing truthful reporting. First, the company can use the
managers’ private information to perfectly coordinate the divisions’ operations. This
results in high expected company earnings. Second, due to unobservable effort
supply, the managers have an incentive to misreport their private information in the
participative budgeting process. The company has to induce the managers to
truthfully report the relevant private information. Thus, next to incentive costs for a
high effort supply, the company incurs additional incentive costs for inducing truth-
telling. Under a participative budgeting process, the company obtains the
coordination benefits and bears the additional incentive costs. When a top-down
budgeting process is implemented, the company forfeits the coordination benefits
and saves on the additional incentive costs, because the managers are kept
uninformed. The design of the budgeting process thus trades off these two economic
effects in the opposite direction.
For a low importance of coordination, the company prefers to use a top-down
budgeting process instead of a participative budgeting process. In the case of a low
importance of coordination, the coordination benefits are small. The additional
incentive costs exceed the coordination benefits. Whereas coordination benefits are
increasing in the importance of coordination the additional incentive costs are
decreasing. Thus, for a high importance of coordination, the coordination benefits
outweigh the additional incentive costs. Then, the participative budgeting process is
preferred by the company. Hence, the managing owner affects the company’s
profitability through the choice of the budgeting process.
Budgeting systems are often criticized for centralizing decision making (for
example, see Hansen et al. 2003). Thus, practitioners would like to use more
participation in the budgeting system (Libby and Lindsay 2010). This does not seem
astonishing when taking the findings of this paper into account. The results indicate
that managers favor the participative budgeting process. Hence, the call for more
participation in the budgeting process is potentially driven by managers’ self interest
and might not always be in the best interests of the company. In particular, the
present paper shows that, for a low importance of coordination, the company prefers
a top-down budgeting process.
The relative attractiveness of a top-down and a participative budgeting process is
affected by the earnings potential. An increase in the earning potential enhances the
use of a participative compared to a top-down budgeting process.
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Appendix
Proof Observation 1
First, the first best solution is considered. Taking the principal’s and the agents’
utilities into account (Eqs. 2 and 3) as well as the probability to obtain high earnings
h (Eq. 1), the principal solves the following program for i ¼ 1; 2:
max
wfb
i
E h x wfb1  wfb2
   ðP fbÞ
subject to:
wfbi  0 ðLL fbÞ
E wfbi  c
  0 ðIR fbÞ
a 2 argmaxa^ g1 þ g2  b g1 þ g2  a^j j ðIC P fbÞ:
The incentive compatibility constraint (IC P fb) determines the first best level of
coordinating adaptions, afb ¼ g1 þ g2. Thus, h ¼ g1 þ g2. The limited liability
constraints (LL fb) and the individual rationality constraints (IR fb) imply that agent
i receives a positive expected compensation payment. As the principal observes the
provided effort level, she minimizes the compensation costs by paying wfbi ¼ c
when she observes high effort supply. Thus, the principal obtains the following
expected utility:
Efb½UP ¼ E½g1 þ g2xH  2c:
Agent i’s expected utility is:
Efb½UAi  ¼ wfbi  c ¼ c c ¼ 0: ð9Þ
Second, the second benchmark is examined. The principal solves the following
program for i ¼ 1; 2:
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max
w
H;b2
i
ðgiÞ;wL;b2i ðgiÞ
E

h xH  wH;b21 ðg1Þ  wH;b22 ðg2Þ
 
þ 1 hð Þ wL;b21 ðg1Þ  wL;b22 ðg2Þ
 e1; e2

ðP b2Þ
subject to:
w
H;b2
i ðgiÞ;wL;b2i ðgiÞ 0 ðLL b2Þ
E hwH;b2i ðgiÞ þ 1 hð ÞwL;b2i ðgiÞ
e1; e2
 
 0 ðIR b2Þ
hðei ¼ 1; ej ¼ 1Þ wH;b2i ðgiÞ  wL;b2i ðgiÞ
h i
þ wL;b2i ðgiÞ  c
 hðei ¼ 0; ej ¼ 1Þ wH;b2i ðgiÞ  wL;b2i ðgiÞ
h i
þ wL;b2i ðgiÞ ðIC b2Þ
a 2 argmaxa^ g1 þ g2  b g1 þ g2  a^j j ðIC P b2Þ
:
In this case, the principal sets w
H;b2
i ðgiÞ ¼ wL;b2i ðgiÞ ¼ 0. She chooses the coordi-
nating adaptions so as to maximize E½h, i.e., ab2 ¼ g1 þ g2. The limited liability
constraints (LL b2) and the incentive compatibility constraints (IC b2) imply the
individual rationality constraints. The incentive compatibility constraints (IC b2)
imply w
H;b2
i ðgiÞ c=gi. Due to the principal’s objective function, the bonus payment
is w
H;b2
i ðgiÞ ¼ c=gi. Thus, the principal obtains the following expected utility:
Eb2½UP ¼ E½g1 þ g2xH  c
g2H þ 6gHgL þ g2L
2gHgL
:
Agent i’s expected utility is
Eb2½UAi  ¼ E hwH;b2i ðgiÞ
h i
 c ¼ cþ c ðgH þ gLÞ
2
4gHgL
 c ¼ c ðgH þ gLÞ
2
4gHgL
; ð10Þ
where Eb2½UAi [ 0. Thus, compared to the first best solution, agent i obtains a
positive rent, because Eb2½UAi [Efb½UAi  according to Eq. 9. h
Proof Proposition 1
The individual rationality constraints (IR TB) are met because of the limited
liability constraints (LL TB) and the incentive compatibility constraints (IC TB).
The principal’s objective (P TB) highlights that positive compensation payments in
the event of low earnings decrease the principal’s expected utility without any
benefits. Thus, the compensation payments w
L;TB
i for i ¼ 1; 2 are optimally set equal
to zero.
The principal chooses the coordinating adaptions so as to maximize E½h, i.e.,
aTB ¼ E½g1 þ g2. The incentive compatibility constraints (IC TB) imply
w
H;TB
i  c=E½gi. Due to the principal’s objective function, the bonus payment is
w
H;TB
i ¼ c=E½gi.
According to Eq. 2, the principal thus obtains the following expected utility:
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ETB½UP ¼ E½g1 þ g2 
1
2
ðgH  gLÞb
	 

xH  wH;TB1  wH;TB2
 
:
According to Eq. 3, agent i’s expected utility is given by
ETB½UAi  ¼ E hwH;TBi
  c ¼ c 1 ðgH  gLÞb
E½g1 þ g2
 
:
Because of
E½g1 þ g2  bðgH  gLÞ [|{z}
b\ gLgHgL
0:5gH þ 0:5gL  gL ¼ 0:5ðgH  gLÞ[ 0;
agent i’s expected utility ETB½UAi  is positive. h
Proof Proposition 2
The following proof is organized in several steps.
Step (i) At date 2, the principal chooses the coordinating adaptions a according to
the following:
a 2 argmaxa^ E g1 þ g2  b g1 þ g2  a^j j j r1; r2; e1; e2½ :
Thanks to the truth-telling constraints for the agents (TT PB), the agents’ reports are
truthful, i.e., ri ¼ gi for i ¼ 1; 2. Thus, the optimal coordinating adaptions a become
r1 þ r2, i.e., aPB ¼ r1 þ r2 ¼ g1 þ g2. The incentive compatibility constraints (IC
PB) ensure that the agents provide high effort, i.e., ei ¼ 1 for i ¼ 1; 2. In sum,
h r1 ¼ g1; r2 ¼ g2; e1 ¼ 1; e2 ¼ 1ð Þ ¼ g1 þ g2.
Step (ii) Due to the limited liability constraints (LL PB) the right-hand side of the
incentive compatibility constraints (IC PB) is non-negative. Thus, the individual
rationality constraints (IR PB) are met. According to the principal’s objective (P
PB), the principal’s expected utility is decreasing in w
H;PB
i ðriÞ and wL;PBi ðriÞ for
i ¼ 1; 2. Thus, she would like to set the compensation payments as low as possible.
The agents are risk-neutral. Having w
L;PB
i ðriÞ[ 0 does not alleviate the moral
hazard problem. Thus, the principal sets w
L;PB
i ðriÞ ¼ 0.
Step (iii) For the incentive compatibility constraints (IC PB) and the truth-telling
constraints (TT PB), the findings of steps (i) and (ii) are used, i.e., aPB ¼ r1 þ r2 and
w
L;PB
i ðriÞ ¼ 0. Then, the incentive compatibility constraint for agent i for i; j ¼ 1; 2
is given by the following:
w
H;PB
i ðgiÞ
c
gi
: ð11Þ
This implies that agent i needs a higher bonus payment for gi ¼ gL to induce high
effort supply than for gi ¼ gH. According to the principal’s objective (P PB), she
prefers small compensation payments. Thus:
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w
H;PB
i ðgLÞ ¼
c
gL
: ð12Þ
If the principal paid agent i the bonus payment w
H;PB
i ðgLÞ ¼ cgL also for a high report,
agent i would have no incentive to misreport. Thus, in the optimal solution:
w
H;PB
i ðgHÞ
c
gL
: ð13Þ
For gi ¼ gH , the truth-telling constraints for agent i for i; j ¼ 1; 2 and i 6¼ j are given
by the following:
w
H;PB
i ðgHÞ
c
gL
gH þ gj  bðgH  gLÞ
gH þ gj|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
2ð0;1Þ
: ð14Þ
For gi ¼ gL, the truth-telling constraints for agent i for i; j ¼ 1; 2 and i 6¼ j are given
by the following:
w
H;PB
i ðgLÞ
c
gL
gL þ gj
gL þ gj  bðgH  gLÞ|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
[ 1
: ð15Þ
Inequality 13 implies that inequality 15 is fulfilled. Thus, the optimal compensation
scheme is as small as possible and meets the inequality 11 for gi ¼ gH, inequality
13, inequality 14 for gj ¼ gH, and inequality 14 for gj ¼ gH. Meeting the inequality
14 for gj ¼ gH implies that also the inequality 14 for gj ¼ gL is met. In addition,
c
gH
\ cgL and
c
gL
2gHbðgHgLÞ
2gH
\ cgL. In sum:
w
H;PB
i ðgHÞ ¼ max
c
gH
;
c
gL
2gH  bðgH  gLÞ
2gH
 
; ð16Þ
where
c
gL
2gH  bðgH  gLÞ
2gH
 c
gH
() b 2:
Thus, for b 2 0;min 2; gLgHgL
n o 
, the optimal bonus payment for ri ¼ gH is as
follows:
w
H;PB
i ðgHÞ ¼
c
gL
2gH  bðgH  gLÞ
2gH
: ð17Þ
Step (iv) Using truth-telling by the agents, aPB ¼ g1 þ g2 from step (i), the payments
w
L;PB
i ðriÞ ¼ 0 from step (ii), Eqs. 2, 3, 12, and 17 from step (iii), the principal’s and
agent i’s, i ¼ 1; 2, expected utilities are calculated:
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EPB½UP ¼E½g1 þ g2xH 
c
4gHgL
8gHðgH þ gLÞ  bðgH  gLÞð3gH þ gLÞ½ :
EPB½UAi  ¼c
gH
gL
 bðgH  gLÞð3gH þ gLÞ
8gHgL
	 

:
For b 2 0;min 2; gLgHgL
n o 
, comparing EPB½UAi  with ETB½UAi  as stated in Eq. 5
yields: EPB½UAi [ETB½UAi . h
Proof Corollary 1
Neither agent 1 nor agent 2 wants to misreport if the other agent reports truthfully.
This is ensured by the incentive compatibility constraint (IC PB). Next, the impact
of agent i’s misreporting on agent j’s expected utility is considered, i; j ¼ 1; 2; i 6¼ j:
EPB½UAj j rj ¼gj; ri ¼ E gi þ gj  b gi  rij j
 
w
H;PB
j ðrjÞ  c
E gi þ gj
 
w
H;PB
j ðrjÞ  c ¼ EPB½UAj j ri ¼ gi; rj ¼ gj:
ð18Þ
The inequality follows from the optimal report agent i can send from agent j’s
viewpoint, i.e., ri ¼ gi. This implies that the agent receives a higher expected utility
when agent i reports truthfully. Thus, agent j does not benefit from agent i’s mis-
reporting. In sum, neither agent wants the other agent to misreport on his behalf.
Next, the impact of both agents’ misreporting on agent i’s expected utility is
considered, i; j ¼ 1; 2; i 6¼ j:
EPB½UAi j ri; rj ¼E gi þ gj  b gi þ gj  ri  rj
  wH;PBi ðriÞ  c
E gi þ gj  b gi  rij j
 
w
H;PB
i ðriÞ  c ¼ EPB½UAj j rj ¼ gj; ri:
Using, inequality 18 implies that agent i does not benefit from collusion. Both
agents’ expected utility is smaller when both agents misreport compared to when
both agents report truthfully. Thus, the agents do not want to collude.
Next, the impact of agent i not supplying high effort on agent i’s and j’s expected
utility is considered, i; j ¼ 1; 2; i 6¼ j:
EPB½UAi j ei ¼0; ej ¼ 1 ¼ E½gjwH;PBi ðriÞ\E½ðgi þ gjÞwH;PBi ðriÞ  c;
EPB½UAj j ei ¼0; ej ¼ 1 ¼ E½gjwH;PBj ðrjÞ  c\E½ðgi þ gjÞwH;PBj ðrjÞ  c:
The first inequality follows from the incentive compatibility constraints (IC PB).
Thus, both agents’ expected utilities decline when the agents collude regarding
effort supply. Collusion is not beneficial for the agents. h
Proof Proposition 3
Comparing the principal’s expected utility with participative budgets as stated in
Eq. 6 with her expected utility with top-down budgets as stated in Eq. 4 yields:
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EPB½UP  ETB½UP  0
() b bc :¼ 8cgHðgH þ gLÞ
c 3g2H  4gHgL þ g2Lð Þ þ 2gHgLðgH þ gLÞxH
:
Because of
3g2H  4gHgL þ g2L |{z}
g2
H
[ g2
L
2g2H  4gHgL þ 2g2L ¼
ﬃﬃﬃ
2
p
gH 
ﬃﬃﬃ
2
p
gL
 2
 0;
the denominator of bc is positive. The numerator of bc is also positive, and thus,
bc[ 0. h
Proof Corollary 2
The principal’s expected utility with top-down budgets is monotonically decreasing
in b:
oETB½UP
ob
¼  gH  gL
2
xH  4c
E½g1 þ g2
 
\0:
The principal’s expected utility with participative budgets is monotonically
increasing in b:
oEPB½UP
ob
¼ c
4gHgL
ðgH  gLÞð3gH þ gLÞ[ 0:
h
Proof Corollary 3
The cut-off level bc is monotonically decreasing in xH :
obc
oxH
¼  16cg
2
HðgH þ gLÞ2
c 3g2H  4gHgL þ g2Lð Þ þ 2gHgLðgH þ gLÞxHð Þ2
\0:
Thus, for an increase in xH the interval for b in which using a top-down budgeting
process is optimal, i.e., ð0; bcÞ, becomes smaller, whereas the interval for b in which
using a participative budgeting process is preferred, i.e., bc;min 2; gLgHgL
n oh 
,
becomes larger. h
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